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ABSTRACT 
This article examines Jordan's role in the creation of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), from 
its origins to its sudden demise in the turmoil of the 1990-91 Gulf crisis and war. The analysis 
focuses on three key factors in Jordan's foreign policy, namely, the concern with external 
security threats, the pressures of domestic politics, and the economic constraints on the 
Jordanian regime. 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 
 This article examines Jordan's role in the creation of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), from 
its origins to its sudden demise in the turmoil of the 1990-91 Gulf crisis and war. The analysis 
focuses on three key factors in Jordan's foreign policy, namely, the concern with external 
security threats, the pressures of domestic politics, and the economic constraints on the 
Jordanian regime. This study suggests the need to move beyond standard military-security 
explanations of inter-state alliance dynamics and take into account the influence of domestic 
politics and political economy on policy-makers. It also demonstrates the continuing tension 
between state sovereignty and pan-Arab agendas for greater economic integration.  
 On 16 February 1989, the heads of state of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and North Yemen met in 
Baghdad to announce the formation of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC). This Council 
appeared to be part of a broader trend in Arab regional politics, as its creation was followed the 
very next day by the formation of the Arab Maghrib Union (AMU).1 Both the ACC and the AMU 
had been preceded much earlier by the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 
1981.2 Taken together, these three alliances within the Arab world meant that 15 Arab states 
were members of major economic and political organizations outside of the League of Arab 
States. The formation of these regional blocs caused a great deal of media speculation 
regarding the future of inter-Arab politics. There was considerable optimism and hope placed in 
the three alliances, which seemed to many observers to mark the beginning of a new era in 
Arab politics dominated by practical steps toward economic and political cooperation, rather 
than ideological conflicts or inter-Arab power struggles.3  
Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait brought the ACC to a standstill, real progress had been 
made toward greater political and economic cooperation between its four member states.4 This 
article will examine Jordan's role in the creation of the ACC in early February 1989 and trace the 
alliance up to its sudden demise in the turmoil of August 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait.5 
While the lifespan of the ACC was merely a year and a half, it nonetheless revealed much about 
the dynamics of inter-Arab politics and of Jordanian foreign policy in particular.  
In interviews with this author, some Jordanian officials stressed that the ACC-had it reached its 
full potential-would have been comparable not to a defensive alliance, such as NATO, but to 
organizations committed to deep economic integration, such as the European Union.6 This is, 
perhaps, overstating the case, for even the European Union itself failed to meet its own 1992 
deadline for full integration. But the point remains that although the ACC did not represent full 
integration, neither was it just a military defense pact. And more to the point, the fact that it 
never approached full economic integration should not obscure the fact that this alliance 
represented more than a loose political and diplomatic entente. Its Jordanian architects intended 
to move beyond the banalities of many inter-Arab alliances by immediately stressing the 
importance of economic ties. The emphasis for these officials was on political economy, rather 
than on security or ideology, as the key to closer inter-Arab cooperation and unity. Seen in this 
light, Jordan's role in the creation of the ACC merits more attention than it has received. For in 
both its lofty goals and its more moderate achievements, Jordan's experience with the ACC may 
demonstrate the limits of integration and alliance-making in the Arab world, and may serve as a 
bridge case between the Cold War era and its aftermath.7  
In order to examine the implications of this case for understanding both Jordan's foreign policy 
and inter-Arab relations, the analysis will focus on three key factors that have influenced 
Jordan's foreign policy behavior, namely, the concern with external security threats and the 
changing strategic balance of power,8 domestic political pressures,9 and thirdly, the importance 
of economic considerations in the Jordanian regime's calculations of its own security and 
stability.10 An examination of each of these three factors will illuminate the Jordanian role in the 
creation of the ACC. Since the alliance was brought to such an abrupt end, owing to an 
international crisis created in large part by one of its own members, most of the analysis will 
examine the influences on Jordanian policy-makers in the creation, rather than the unmaking, of 
the ACC.  
 
THE PURPOSE OF THE ARAB COOPERATION COUNCIL  
The statutes and by-laws of the ACC stated that the main goal of the alliance was "the 
achievement of the highest degree of cooperation, coordination, integration and solidarity 
among the member states."11 The ACC Charter stressed the economic dimensions of inter-
Arab cooperation, in contrast to the ideological-political emphasis of earlier pan-Arab attempts 
at more formal unification. Absent from the Charter also was any mention of military ties 
amongst the member states.12 Although the ACC did eventually move in the direction of greater 
security coordination, at the outset, at least, the emphasis was placed on economic cooperation. 
All four member states came into the ACC with significant debt burdens, and all were still 
suffering from the decline in global oil prices during the 1980s. While Iraq, as a major oil 
producing country, was more directly affected by the falling oil prices, this decline also had an 
impact on the other three states, the domestic economies of which had become tied to the 
broader regional economy of oil. Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen had each become dependent 
on Gulf labor markets and hence on remittances from the Gulf, and each had felt the pinch of 
the contracting regional oil economy.  
Thus, one purpose of the ACC was to facilitate labor flows between member states, and, in 
particular, sending Jordanian and Egyptian labor to Iraq to assist in the reconstruction that 
followed the eight-year war with Iran. In June 1989, at the first ACC summit meeting, the four 
states agreed to abolish entry visa requirements between them, thus vastly facilitating the free 
flow of labor. Each member state further agreed to give hiring priority to ACC nationals over all 
other laborers.13 Beyond concerns with labor flows, the ACC was also meant to serve as a 
common market to increase inter-Arab trade. Finally, an additional goal of all four states was to 
approach donor countries and institutions as a bloc to renegotiate outstanding debts.14 Even as 
the ties of the ACC states were strengthened, based on mutual economic interest, it soon 
became clear that the member states differed considerably in their visions of the ACC's political 
role. But at least initially, all four states shared in the general cooperation goals of the Jordanian 
policy-makers who, as mentioned above, served as the prime movers behind the formation of 
the new regional alliance.15  
 
JORDAN AND THE RISE OF THE ARAB COOPERATION COUNCIL  
Although the ACC member states emphasized at every opportunity the economic dimensions of 
their alliance, questions remained-especially on the part of neighbors such as the GCC states-
regarding the motivations for, and the implications of, this new alliance. The ACC emerged in 
the context of major changes in the regional strategic balance of power. The Iran-Iraq war had 
just ended, leading to considerable anxiety in the Gulf regarding future Iraqi intentions.16 Iraq 
had, after all, been left out of the GCC when it was formed in 1981. The cessation of hostilities 
in the Gulf in 1988 marked a major strategic change in the regional system, in favor of Iraq. 
Throughout the war with Iran, some of Iraq's major supporters had been its new partners within 
the ACC, namely, Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen. Of these three, Jordan provided by far the 
most extensive level of support.17 Indeed, Jordan's port at `Aqaba and its overland transport 
routes had provided Iraq with its only major economic lifeline during eight years of war. In a 
sense, the creation of the ACC simply institutionalized these bilateral linkages into a multilateral 
alliance.  
For the Jordanian regime, however, the major regional changes that took place in the late 1980s 
involved not only Gulf security, but also Jordan's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1988, 
Jordan's King Husayn renounced Jordan's claims to the West Bank, thereby radically changing 
the strategic situation in the conflict and placing much of the burden of conflict resolution on the 
Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). With the renunciation of its 
West Bank ties, however, Jordan's strategic role in the region seemed suddenly unclear. So for 
Jordanian policy-makers the ACC became a means for Jordan to retain its relevance and 
influence in regional politics beyond simply its role in the Arab-Israeli peace process.18  
The ACC enhanced Jordan's diplomatic and military position vis-a-vis Israel, by bringing 
together, in the same alliance, Egypt (the only state to have signed a peace treaty with Israel) 
and Iraq (a state that Israel now viewed as a serious military threat).19 Jordan was thus assured 
of having key allies in case of peace or war in the region. It was, therefore, in a position either to 
help promote peace initiatives to include even Iraq, or in the event of war, to be backed by Iraq 
in case it was itself attacked. One of the most common terms used by Jordanian policy-makers 
at that time to describe the usefulness of their alliance with Iraq was "strategic depth."20 That 
depth was perceived as bolstering not only Jordan's external security in relation to Israel, but 
also, more tangentially, the security of the Arab Gulf states (and hence Jordan's critical sources 
of financial aid) against threats from Iran. It should be noted, however, that this view was not 
necessarily shared by Jordan's counterparts in the GCC.  
The strengthening of its ties with Iraq and Egypt through the ACC also enhanced Jordan's 
strategic position vis-a-vis Syria. Although King Husayn took great pains not to isolate or 
provoke the regime of Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad, the new alliance ensured a more 
balanced position between Jordan and its northern neighbor. Jordanian officials suggested that 
Syria would either join the ACC at a later date, and thus diffuse any Jordanian-Syrian tensions, 
or would be held in check by Jordan's powerful Arab allies even if hostility were to reemerge 
between Amman and Damascus.21  
Thus, even without formal defense agreements, the ACC presented non-member states in the 
region with a formidable bloc that could act as a powerful deterrent against potential attackers. 
The presence of both Iraq and Egypt in the same regional alliance, however, also created 
considerable uncertainty and security fears in neighboring states. Marshaling together the 
military might of both Egypt and Iraq might have proved reassuring for Jordan's regime, but it 
was worrisome for the Israeli government and for the ruling regimes in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
Syria.22 The ACC, therefore, created a profound imbalance of regional military might within the 
Arab world. As a reflection of this uneasiness, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia made a high profile 
visit to both Cairo and Baghdad in March 1989, shortly after the ACC was founded, seeking 
reassurances with respect to the organization's security and military intentions. Saudi anxiety 
was deep enough that King Fahd even signed a non-aggression pact with Iraq before leaving 
Baghdad.23  
Largely to reassure other Arab countries, and particularly Saudi Arabia, the ACC states 
repeatedly stressed the economic dimensions of their alliance and denied they had any political 
or military intentions. But during the June 1989 meeting of their Supreme Council (made up of 
the four heads of state) in Alexandria, Egypt, the ACC countries called for greater coordination 
of their foreign policies, agreed not to use force against each other, and further committed 
themselves to the establishment of a joint defense pact.24  
These developments may have only added to the security anxieties of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
Syria, and reinforced their earliest suspicions regarding ACC intentions. All three countries had 
reason to fear any resurgence of Iraqi power in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war. In their attempts 
to calm such fears, the ACC states stressed that unlike the other two Arab regional 
organizations-the GCC and the AMU-their organization had not limited its membership to a 
geographical subregion and was open to all Arab states that wished to apply for membership.25  
For the Jordanians, however, the key question remained what role Syria would play. For 
although 15 Arab states belonged to either the ACC, AMU or GCC, Syria was the only major 
Arab power that remained outside all three alliances. But since Syria was neither a Maghribi nor 
a Gulf state, the only one of these blocs that might have been accused of excluding Damascus 
was the ACC. From the Jordanian regime's perspective, the absence of Syria was a hindrance 
to the long-term success of the ACC.26 However, given the continuous hostility between Iraq 
and Syria, the Jordanians were well aware that bringing Syria into the ACC would be a difficult 
and lengthy task.27  
To avoid incurring Syrian hostility to its alliance venture, Jordan kept the Syrian regime apprised 
of all ACC developments. King Husayn even made use of his personal diplomacy in various 
attempts to reconcile the regimes in Baghdad and Damascus, as a way to extend membership 
in the ACC to Syria. As early as 1986, well before the ACC had even come to fruition, the King 
had arranged a secret meeting between Syrian president Asad and Iraqi president Saddam 
Husayn at an air base in southern Jordan.28 This attempt at mediation and inter-Arab 
reconciliation was unsuccessful. But even though Jordan's various efforts failed, they did not go 
entirely unappreciated in Damascus, and Syrian officials made it clear that while Syria would not 
itself become an ACC member, it would nonetheless not oppose the grouping.29  
Although the Jordanians may have felt more regionally secure as a result of the ACC, these 
considerations were not the only factors behind their desire to form the alliance in the first place; 
they viewed the military strength of their Egyptian and Iraqi allies as an additional asset to a 
primarily economically-oriented alliance.30 The strategic depth gained by the political-economic 
alliance was an added bonus, while the main concerns of the Jordanian regime remained 
focused on its own precarious economic position and its domestic problems.31 Thus, while the 
creation of the ACC caused non-member states to reexamine their strategic positions and to 
assess the security implications of the new alliance, external security concerns do not appear to 
have been the main motivation even on the part of Jordan, the militarily-weakest ACC partner 
(much less on the part of Egypt or Iraq). It is, therefore, necessary to look elsewhere for the 
primary motivations behind the ACC.  
 
DOMESTIC POLITICS: UNREST, REFORM AND CHANGING COALITIONS  
The Jordanian decision to create the ACC came in the context of increasing domestic 
uncertainty and regime insecurity, and was followed almost immediately by upheaval and 
profound domestic change in Jordan. Like many other states in the region, Jordan's domestic 
political and economic scene had been deeply affected by the decline in the regional economy 
due to the global recession in the 1980s. After the mid-1970s, the Jordanian regime had been 
able to ride the wave of the oil boom, growing increasingly reliant on external sources of aid to 
meet its budgetary needs. By the mid-1980s, however, that boom was over, as the price of oil 
plummeted. The Jordanian economy was seriously affected as aid and worker remittances 
declined and the domestic sectors of the economy contracted. Because of their own declining 
revenues, Arab Gulf states cut their aid to the kingdom, which only exacerbated an already 
difficult economic situation. Taken together, these increasingly severe economic constraints 
soon affected the domestic stability of the state and the security of the Jordanian regime. When 
the government announced its compliance with an austerity program sponsored by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), rioting broke out throughout Jordan in April of 1989.32  
The April riots, sometimes referred to within Jordan as an "intifada" (uprising), reflected far more 
than economic unrest.33 The IMF program had merely provided the spark for an explosion of 
deep dissatisfaction with the regime. While the Hashimite royal family had been aware of 
Jordan's increasingly precarious economic position, it had sorely underestimated the political 
depth of the family's legitimacy crisis vis-a-vis its own society. It is perhaps ironic that this 
unequivocal signal to Jordan's leaders occurred within months of the founding of the ACC. Most 
importantly, the April riots were not really reflective of the perhaps overemphasized Palestinian-
East Banker differences within Jordanian society but rather were instigated largely from within 
the East Bank community itself. The unrest originated in Ma'n, in the south of Jordan, a 
community that the regime took for granted as a bedrock constituency for the House of Hashim, 
given its history of support for the regime.  
The domestic upheaval served as a kind of wake-up call for the regime, prompting the 
government to accelerate what it claimed was an already-initiated program of political 
reforms.34 Except for the reestablishment of parliament in 1984, for the first time since 1967, 
little else had been accomplished despite considerable rhetoric. In the aftermath of the 1989 
riots, King Husayn attempted to adjust to the existing difficult circumstances through a limited 
program of political liberalization intended to broaden the basis of the Hashimite monarchy's 
domestic support. In a sense, the Hashimites were trying to renegotiate a kind of social contract 
with their people. Given the depth of public anger over IMF reforms and alleged government 
corruption, this required significant concessions. Within weeks of the riots, King Husayn had 
reshuffled the cabinet, sacked the extremely unpopular prime minister, Zayd al-Rifa'i, and 
announced that new elections were to be held later that year. This liberalization process was 
expanded in the early 1990s to include loosening government oversight of the media, lifting 
martial law in place since the 1967 war, and legalizing political parties.35 After earlier stalling 
tactics and disappointments, the political liberalization process finally appeared to be at a real 
take-off point, but only after the violent events of April 1989.36  
What is significant about these events, even though they occurred two months after the 
emergence of the ACC, is that they make clear the depth of the regime's domestic insecurity as 
it worked to bring that alliance to fruition. The riots, in other words, did not emerge in a vacuum 
but from long-accumulated domestic discontent. While the riots clearly cannot be said to be the 
reason behind the creation of the ACC, they did have a strong impact on the direction of the 
new alliance's development, and on its implications for the Jordanian regime. In this difficult 
domestic context, the ACC became part of the foreign policy dimension of a broader adjustment 
program to ensure the long term viability of the Hashimite monarchy. At the inception of the 
ACC in February 1989, the member states had staked out goals for economic cooperation; but 
after the April riots, Jordanian officials pressed for more than a cosmetic political and economic 
alliance between the four countries. In interviews, many officials emphasized the importance of 
Jordan's foreign relations as the key to economic stability, and hence domestic social peace, 
within the kingdom.37  
Meanwhile, the economic liberalization and political democratization process that began in mid-
1989 opened up the system to greater political activity for the Jordanian public, including 
business elites who were highly enthusiastic about the ACC's economic potential. The 
liberalization effort, in fact, opened the way for interest groups to form together as informal 
policy coalitions in efforts to affect the policy process to a greater extent than ever before. These 
developments enhanced the political role of the commercial bourgeoisie in particular, which 
found that some of its interests matched those of the Jordanian regime.38 One aspect of this 
policy convergence was the push for greater market access not only for Jordanian labor but also 
for Jordanian exports. Already heavily engaged in Iraqi markets, some business people and 
entrepreneurs active in Jordan's export sectors wanted to increase their access to Egyptian 
markets and strengthen their Iraqi connection.39 For these business elites, the ACC 
represented an institutional and organizational structure that ensured that increased access to 
those markets would continue, and could, therefore, be relied upon in the long term.40  
Since the export sector was dominated by Jordanians of Palestinian origin, economic 
liberalization may have functioned as a pay-off to coopt this key segment of Jordanian society at 
a particularly difficult time for the regime economically and politically. The exports that benefited 
most from Jordan's increased trade and investment relations with Iraq, Egypt and North Yemen, 
included agricultural produce, cement, fertilizers, and pharmaceuticals.41 By working with this 
economic elite within Jordanian society, the regime met its demands for increased inter-Arab 
trade.  
Another sector of the Jordanian economic social structure that supported the formation of the 
ACC, and the strengthening of existing ties with Iraq in particular, was the construction 
industry.42 Business people involved in this industry, in both the public and private sectors, saw 
the potential for windfall profits in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. Just as the overland 
transportation sector and the port of `Aqaba had benefited from the Iran-Iraq War by acting as 
Iraq's main supply lines, the construction industry was poised to reap the economic benefits of 
peace.43 A distinctive feature of Jordan's construction industry is that it is one of the most 
popular civilian career areas for Jordan's military officers after they retire. Those retired officers 
enter this profitable industry with considerable military and government connections. The extent 
of retired military participation in the civilian construction sector underscores the blurred lines in 
Jordan between private economic interests and the public sector political elite.44 Very often 
public and private sectors of Jordan's overall political and economic elite actually overlap, 
revealing the linkages that exist between the economic interests of key domestic coalitions, 
such as those interested in export trade and construction, and their preferred foreign policy 
choices.  
In sum, the ACC emerged during a period of domestic unease in Jordan. Jordanian officials 
may have been aware of the mounting tensions, but they clearly underestimated their depth and 
strength. Consequently, domestic constraints were not a key factor in the initial formation of the 
ACC but soon became critical to its evolution and development. These negative pressures 
spurred Jordanian officials to try to get more economically out of the ACC. They were joined, 
following the initial liberalization process, by private sector business elites lobbying for more 
genuine economic integration. The analysis so far has shown that considerations of domestic 
politics and of external security had significant influence on the development of the ACC, but 
were not the initial causes for its formation. For these causal factors, it is necessary to explore 
more fully Jordan's economic circumstances.  
 
AID, MARKETS AND THE DRIVE FOR INTEGRATION  
The founders of the ACC went to great lengths to stress the economic dimensions of this 
alliance, downplaying any security implications and underscoring the benefits of joint economic 
action. It is necessary, therefore, to move analytically beyond the Jordanian domestic political 
arena to place the ACC in its regional political and economic context. Regional and even global 
economic trends influenced not only the particular form the ACC took, but also that taken by the 
AMU in North Africa. Both organizations were certainly influenced by the earlier formation of the 
GCC. Some analysts have suggested that the very similarity in the names of the GCC and the 
ACC underscores the influence of the former on the latter.45  
Perhaps more important, however, was the larger economic change in the global system 
represented by the then looming 1992 date for full European integration. Like other countries in 
the world, the ACC states were influenced by the shifts in the global economy in the direction of 
larger trading blocs. They were particularly concerned with the economic implications of 
European integration for their own extensive trade links with Europe.46 Economic coordination 
within the ACC was to include free movement of labor and capital among member states, as 
well as increasing communication and transportation linkages between them.47 Economic 
integration was also to include joint projects in manufacturing and agricultural production. In 
addition to agreements on cooperation in industry, agriculture, transportation, communications, 
and labor flow, the ACC states also agreed to greater coordination in social affairs, including 
education, health and cultural exchange. The agreements of the ACC made clear that the four-
country organization was to be only the beginning of what would eventually become a much 
larger grouping dedicated to "comprehensive Arab economic integration."48  
The plans of some Jordanian policy-makers were extremely ambitious. Some felt that after the 
hurdle of incorporating Syria had been cleared, Lebanon could easily be included, once its civil 
war ended.49 From there, the ACC could move on to establish direct linkages to the AMU and 
the GCC, thereby establishing the institutional foundations for real Arab integration.50 But these 
rosy expectations clashed with the economic realities of the region in the 1980s. As early as 
1978, Jordan had switched its main Arab alliance from Syria to Iraq, which was far wealthier.51 
Although the Jordanian-Iraqi relationship had developed politically and economically throughout 
the 1980s, it was not enough to forestall Jordan's mounting economic troubles. The decline in 
Arab aid to Jordan, in particular, was a major factor in the February 1989 balance of payments 
crisis for the regime-just as the ACC was founded-and led to extreme instability for the 
Jordanian dinar.52  
The precipitous decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s, as well as in Arab financial aid and 
remittances from Jordanian labor, created a serious debt situation for the kingdom. Summing up 
the extent of Jordan's debt crisis in 1989, one economic report noted that "debt servicing has 
emerged as the millstone around Jordan's neck."53 One of the clearest signs of Jordan's 
increasing financial difficulties was the government's announcement in March 1989 that 
Jordan's Central Bank would cease all loan repayments to individual country lenders. This 
policy was announced only after the government had also made clear that it had very reluctantly 
turned to the IMF and the World Bank to request the rescheduling of its debt repayments.54  
As noted earlier, the IMF-sponsored austerity program triggered a violent public response. If the 
riots of April 1989 shocked the Hashimite monarchy, they also surprised Arab Gulf states, which 
rushed emergency transfers of aid and even oil shipments to the kingdom in an attempt to shore 
up the monarchy and reestablish stability in Jordan. While the Jordanian authorities welcomed 
this assistance, there was nonetheless bitterness at both the state and the popular levels that 
such severe domestic upheavals had been necessary before Arab aid was offered to the 
kingdom. The official government line on the disturbances included scathing attacks on Gulf 
states for failing to fulfill the pledges of aid they had made at the 1978 Baghdad summit.55 In 
short, the Jordanian regime was quick to place the blame on policies outside its own control, 
rather than focus on economic mismanagement or political bungling of the country's domestic 
affairs. Jordanians, however, were more critical of their government, and even East Bank elites, 
the traditional backbone of Hashimite rule, sent delegations with petitions to King Husayn 
making clear their demands for political reform.56 Public concern and scorn were directed, in 
particular, at government nepotism and corruption.  
While much of this hostility was directed against particular government officials, such as Prime 
Minister Rifa'i, the general public's disillusionment with their government continued even after 
particular individuals (like the prime minister) were removed from power. After the 1989 
elections, the caretaker government of Sharif Zayd ibn Shakir was replaced by another veteran 
prime minister, Mudar Badran, who then came under verbal attack for his past actions in 
government. Badran, a longtime loyalist and confidant of the king, had served as prime minister 
for most of the period 1976-84. But in the new climate of political democratization and greater 
openness of the media, parliamentary factionalism also came to the fore. A surprised Badran 
actually had to fight to win a vote of confidence in parliament in order to begin his new 
administration, and to fend off attacks by other powerful elites about the way he had previously 
served in office.57  
Despite the long term political fallout from the April 1989 uprising, the immediate effect of the 
quick money transfers from sympathetic Gulf states, coupled with the IMF agreement, was to 
ease Jordan's balance of payments difficulties. In sum, just as the political uprising had 
underscored the regime's need to strengthen its domestic basis, it had also made clear its need 
for more durable economic arrangements with its neighbors. Those considerations enhanced 
the importance of the ACC in the eyes of the regime, as this alliance provided Jordan with the 
institutional framework it needed to improve regional economic cooperation that could boost the 
Jordanian economy as a whole. Thus, the main reason the Jordanians were careful to reassure 
the Gulf states about the ACC's intentions had almost nothing to do with concerns for military-
security implications. Rather, the Jordanians wanted to make sure that while they were reaping 
the economic benefits of their membership in the ACC they were not sacrificing the kingdom's 
critical aid linkages to the GCC states.58 The Jordanian government, therefore, attempted not 
only to establish the ACC as a new regional bloc, but also to mold this alliance specifically to 
meet Jordan's pressing economic needs. Meeting those needs was understood to be critical to 
the long term political survival of the Hashimite monarchy.  
 
JORDAN AND THE FALL OF THE ARAB COOPERATION COUNCIL  
As major architects of the ACC, Jordanian policy-makers believed that they had constructed an 
alliance that would stand the test of time. Based on mutual economic interest, the ACC was to 
ensure long term stability in Jordan's relations with its Arab neighbors. The Jordanian policy-
makers predicted that eventually more and more Arab countries would join the ACC. But despite 
their lofty goals, and the initial optimism that many of them had been achieved, the Jordanian 
policy-makers were not prepared when their experiment came crashing down.59  
With the onset of the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91, the ACC became instantly deadlocked, as 
its two most powerful members-Iraq and Egypt-shifted overnight from ACC allies to military 
adversaries.60 Notwithstanding the numerous Hashimite attempts at defusing the crisis, the 
ACC proved an empty shell in the face of its own members' hostility toward one another. And 
after the crisis, when the smoke had cleared from Operation "Desert Storm," few noticed that 
the deadline for renewal of the ACC charter had come and gone. The ACC was, for all intents 
and purposes, dead.  
Even before the crisis marked the end of the ACC, however, the member states had run into 
problems trying to move beyond economic cooperation to political and security agreements. 
Ultimately, the problems reflected fundamentally different visions of the political role of the ACC. 
For the Jordanians, the ACC was a political-economic bloc that would start with the four 
countries and later extend to a far broader regional alliance. Yemen may have shared this 
general view. But the real problem lay with the two more powerful members of the alliance. Iraq 
made consistent attempts to politicize the ACC and bring it in line with Iraqi foreign policy, 
particularly as a force against Syria. Egypt, on the other hand, strongly resisted these 
maneuvers, and tried to avoid closer political or security ties with Iraq, emphasizing all the while 
the purely economic aspect of the alliance.61  
In some respects the Egyptian government accomplished what may have been an additional 
goal for joining the ACC, namely being readmitted to the League of Arab States, which was 
achieved in part through ACC pressure. But for Iraq, in contrast, the political and economic 
linkages within the alliance were only the beginning of a broader political agenda. These ulterior 
motives, in effect, led to conflict within the alliance and to considerable resentment on the part of 
the Jordanians. They felt that the Egyptians and Iraqis might have been pursuing cynical self-
serving strategies from the start, while they themselves believed in the greater potential of the 
ACC. Reflecting on what went wrong with the ACC, one former prime minister of Jordan 
remarked that while Jordan and Yemen worked well together, "the other two were of course 
trying to dominate the show."62 Another official concluded with more bitterness that "the ACC 
was a disaster; we wanted a forum for economic and political cooperation, the Egyptians 
wanted purely an economic forum, and the Iraqis just wanted to take advantage of us."63  
With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, much of this debate became moot. The ACC never officially 
collapsed, yet neither did it revive. In sharp contrast to the fanfare and ceremonies that had 
marked the inauguration of the new alliance in 1989, the ACC in essence simply faded away as 
its charter expired in 1991, and continuing hostility between key members prevented its 
renewal. With their main Arab alliance partners now facing off against one another under the 
looming shadow of war, the Jordanian regime had a very important decision to make. To the 
surprise and chagrin of its Western allies, the historically conservative and pro-Western regime 
did not follow conventional expectations and support the US-led coalition against Iraq. Instead, it 
maintained its alliance with Iraq while simultaneously attempting to appease all sides of the 
crisis and avert a regional war. Jordanian policy-makers believed that had their strategy 
succeeded, the peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis would have provided the basis for the 
restoration of the ACC, with Jordan as the mediator between Egypt and Iraq.64 But Jordan's 
Gulf crisis strategy, like the ACC itself, proved to be a failure with damaging political and 
economic consequences for the Hashimite kingdom.  
 
CONCLUSION  
This examination of the rise and fall of the ACC suggests the need to move beyond standard 
military-security explanations of inter-state alliance dynamics, in order to incorporate a more 
complex model that takes into account domestic politics and political economy as key elements 
influencing policy-makers. Jordan's experience with the ACC underscores the importance of 
focusing on the changing dynamics of its domestic politics, as well as on the economic 
underpinnings of its regime's stability, for a full explanation of Jordanian foreign policy 
behavior.65 At the same time, however, Jordan's experience suggests that the fullest and most 
accurate explanations for the formation of the ACC, or any other inter-Arab alliance, may be 
those that can take into account issues of external security, domestic politics, and political 
economy and assess their relative importance for those alliances.  
In addition, this case has strong implications for understanding the broader regional dynamics-
and limitations-of regional integration and alliances in the Arab world. The abrupt end to the 
ACC experiment calls attention to the triumph of the Westphalian state system. The early 
problems within the ACC regarding the different intentions of its member states, coupled with 
the Gulf crisis itself, both made clear the tensions that exist between integrationist agendas and 
the more dominant tendency of precarious regimes when challenged to fall back on individual 
state sovereignty, and not on pan-Arab unity.66  
Although the ACC represents only a single episode of alliance-making in the Arab world, the 
fate of the ACC demonstrates the limits of unity and integration efforts in contemporary Arab 
politics. The brief triumphs of the ACC, on the other hand, show that, even for a short time, 
otherwise disparate states in the region can form alliances by means of which they can achieve 
meaningful political and economic cooperation. For some of the ACC's Jordanian advocates, 
the lessons of the ACC lie not in its ignominious end, but in the promise it held at its 
inception.67 In sum, the short life of the ACC need not leave us with the idea that unity via 
economic cooperation, even while preserving the political sovereignty of individual states, is 
really that daunting an enterprise. The other regional blocs-the AMU and the GCC-have 
survived well beyond the 1991 Gulf war to continue to play significant roles in inter-Arab 
relations.68  
Many Jordanian policy-makers tend to wax philosophic when discussing the lessons of their 
ACC venture for the future of inter-Arab relations. By recognizing and accepting the limitations 
placed on unity by regimes intent on preserving their state's sovereignty, Jordan would know 
better next time how to proceed toward a more lasting Arab alliance.69 It appears that for the 
time being, Jordan is no longer interested in pursuing its integrationist agenda of creating Arab 
alliance blocs. Following the collapse of the ACC in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, Jordan 
turned away from such Arab alliances. Instead, Jordan moved toward ever-deeper economic 
and strategic cooperation with Western powers, especially the United States, and even more 
importantly, following a peace treaty in 1994, toward full political and economic relations with 
Israel.70  
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